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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UT'AH 
WILLIA~I E. FRENCH, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH OIL REFINING COMPANY, 
a c.orporation, 
·Respondent. 
Case No. 
7396 
Brief of Respondent 
STATE:\IENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is, to say the least, 
meager and partisan. It is in about the same class as his 
pleading. Had plaintiff's complaint alleged the facts 
as shown by the evidence the case probably could have 
been decided upon a general demurrer instead of requir-
ing a trial. A fair reading of the complaint would indi-
cate that plaintiff entered the intersection from the east 
and was proceeding westerly through the intersection. 
Also. it will be observed that there is a total absence in 
the complaint of any reference to the fact that the traffic 
\\Tns controlled by signal lights and a significant absence 
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of any allegation about a left hand turn in the intersec-
tion by plaintiff. The complaint bears evidence of a 
deceptive and misleading pleading. The statement of 
facts in plaintiff's brief i13 of the same caliber. 
It is, of course, axiomatic that plaintiff's case is no 
stronger than his own evidence and as the cross-examina-
tion leaves it. 
When plaintiff entered the intersection from the 
south the light was green for north and south bound 
traffic. He testified on cross-examination (R. 11-12) 
that he first saw defendant's truck to the north and on 
the opposite side of the intersection, ''I was in the inter-
section, just over the walk.'' .A .. nd he saw the Oil Com-
pany tanker 100 to 120 feet a""Nay. That was when he 
first saw it. The truck was running at normal speed, 
about twenty-five miles per hour (R. 12). 
There was a car ahead of plaintiff's ear, also mak-
ing a left hand turn, and the next time plaintiff saw the 
tank truck of defendant it \Vas about six feet away from 
him. It was practically upon him (R. 12). 'Vhile he first 
testified that he attempted to keep both of these cars 
within his vision, he finally testified (R. 13) that he 
didn't know whether he observed the tank truck of 
defendant between the time that he observed it 100 to 120 
feet away and the time he next saw it six feet away. "I 
don't know vvhether I observed it or not." 
During this time plaintiff made a left ha11d turn (R. 
14). There \vere a number of other cars in the intersection 
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at the time. It is a street carrying henvy traffic (R. 14). 
Plaintiff \Yas follo\ving the rn r in front of him within 
three or four feet. 
The front wheel of my rar \vas right on the cross-
\v·alk \vhen it \Vas hit on the rig·ht rear wheel (R. 20). 
Right after the areident plaintiff told l\1r. Olson 
(the driYer of defendant's truck) that he thought hH 
had time to make the turn (R. 16); and told Mr. Porter 
(defendant's claim adjuster) that he was under the traf-
fic light, in the intersection, when he first noticed the tank 
truck (R. 18). He also testified as follows, upon direct 
examination (R. 3-6) : 
"Q. What \Yas it, if anything, that caused the colli-
sion, if there \Yas a eollision ~ 
''A. Well, there \vas a car ahead of me and I 
couldn't get out quite fast enough. 
"Q. How fast Vlere you traveling~ 
"A. About eight miles an hour." 
He also testified that he examined the tracks after 
the accident and if the truck had gone straight thHre 
was plenty of room to miss his car but. it swung to the 
west . 
.Jir. Reeves, \vho VtTas vvith plaintiff in his car, testi-
fied that when they \\Tere making the left turn the signal 
light turned yello\v, at Vtrhich time defendant's truck was 
•) 
,) 
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125, maybe 150 feet, away. It hadn't entered the inter-
section; and that it was coming fairly fast, 25 miles 
per hour. 
On cross-examination, however, he testified that 
when plaintiff entered the intersection from the south 
that he saw the tank truck and that, at that time, the 
truck was probably 50 feet north of the crosswalk (about 
150 or 140 feet from plaintiff's car to the north), at which 
time the light 'vas green (R. 36, 37 and 25). The width 
of the intersection was about 90 feet. 
He also testified that plaintiff was 30 feet behind the 
car in front of him (R. 37). He also testified that the 
tank truck 'vas in the west lane of traffic on the west side 
of Second West (R. 38). 
'' Q. What did you say the distance was between 
the French car and the Utah Oil truck: When you arrived 
at a position west and south of the semaphore~ 
"A. It "\Vas about half the width of the pavement." 
(About 45 feet). 
He also testified, 
'' Q. When you started to turn do you know whether 
or not the Utah Oil truck had entered the intersection~ 
''A. When we started to turn it was crossing the 
side-walk. It ha.dn 't crossed the side,valk when we saw 
it (the light) turn." 
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He also testified (R. 41) that the trurk veered ahout 
forty feet to the ,,·est. On t;ross-examination he testified 
(R. 43) that at the time of impact the Utah Oil truck 
"~as \Yithin ten to t"~el ve feet of the \vest crosswalk. 
Plaintiff then \Yas called for further direct examina-
tion (R. ±-!) and tt1stified that he was at a point marked 
"1" on the diagram on the board (not in evidence) when 
he sa\\- the tanker 120 feet a\vay. On cross-examination, 
ho'\vever, this point \Yas fixed at six feet from the point 
of impact (R. -!3) and that he went six feet at eight miles 
per hour \vhile the truck 'vas going 120 feet at 20 or 25 
miles per hour (an impossibility "~hich no one \Vas obli-
gated to believe). 
It makes no difference \vhich of these vanous 
stories plaintiff adopts as the one which he will stick to, 
he is guilty of contributory negligence under the statutes 
and decisions of this court ; and he is not relieved of his 
negligenee by the last clear chance rule. 
Under story No. 1 as told by himself he entered the 
intersection when the light \Yas green, at "\Vhich time the 
truck \vas 100 to 120 feet from him about 40 feet north 
of the north crosswalk. He \Vas driving eight miles per 
hour and the truck was coming 20 to 25 miles per hour 
on the west lane of the west side of the highway, and 
he made a left hand turn follo·\ving another car in front 
of the truck, and ''"'as hit because he thought he could 
make it and because his car didn't take up as fast as he 
thought it \Yould. 
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2. On his story No. 2 as told by himself he didn't 
see the truck until six feet from the point of impact, at 
which time the truck was 120 feet away. He was travel-
ing eight miles per hour and the truck was going 20 to 
25 miles per hour. It is pure mathematics that if he went 
six feet at eight miles per hour, the truck at 25 miles 
per hour did not go to exceed 20 feet between the time he 
saw it and the time of the colli~ion. To travel100 to 120 
feet in the distance that plaintif was going six feet at 
eight miles per hour, :the truck would have to go about 
144 miles per hour, which was contrary to his own evi-
dence and which no one had to believe and which the 
court was at liberty to disregard. 
3. On story No. 3 as told by Reeves, the truck \Vas 
40 feet away when they drove in front of it. His story 
that the truck was in the west lane of travel and that it 
veered 30 to 40 feet west from its position on the highway 
and collided "\\ith plaintiff's car ten or twelve feet east 
of the west crosswalk is another miracle that no one had 
to believe. The fact remained that according to his story 
plaintiff drove in front of the truck when it was 40 feet 
away, according to one story; 100 to 120 feet away ac-
cording to another story; and when plaintiff was six 
feet from the point of impact according to another story; 
and in all stories defendant's oncoming truck was travel-
ing at 20 to 25 miles per hour. 
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ARGUl\IENT 
Plaintiff \Yas guilty of contributory negligence upon 
his O\\?n eYidence and upon the evidence of Reeves. 
1. He violated Section 37-7-137 U.C.A. 1943 in that 
he failed to yield the right of way to defendant's truck 
'vhich had either entered the intersection or was so close 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
2. He Yiola ted Section 57-7-133 U. C.A. 1943 in that 
he turned his Yehicle from a direct course northward to 
\\~esterly when such moYement could not be made with 
reasonable safet)~. 
3. He negligently and carelessly drove and operated 
his car into the pathway of defendant's oncoming vehicle 
in disregard of the hazard to himself and his car when it 
was so close as to constitute a hazard, regardless of any 
question of right of way. 
Plaintiff's own evidence justified the court in direct-
ing a verdict for defendant. He certainly was not helped 
by the evidence of defendant's witnesses, nor it is neces-
sary to consider that evidence in passing upon the ques-
tion presented by this appeal. It is necessary only to cite 
recently decided cases to sustain the trial court. 
Hart vs. Kerr, 110 Utah 479, 175 Pac. 2d 475. 
In that case plaintiff made a left turn in front of an 
oncoming vehicle 300 feet away which was coming at 40 
miles per hour. This court held he was guilty of contri-
butory negligence. In this case under one story he made 
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the left hand turn when the oncoming vehicle was 100 to 
120 feet away, and under another story it was 40 feet 
away. Under all of the stories the oncoming vehicle was 
coming at 20 to 25 miles per hour. 
Cederloff vs. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 Pac. 2d 777. 
In that case defendant drove his car in front of plain-
tiff's oncoming vehicle at a slow rate of speed. This 
court held he was guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law and that a verdict should have been direeted for 
plaintiff who had a right to assum~ that he would stop 
before entering the other lane of traffic. 
"Section 57-7-133, U.C.A. 1943, provides: 
' (a.) No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct 
course upon a highway unless and until such move-
ment can be made with reasonable safety * * *.' 
Defendant turned his car from a direct course in 
the highway into the lane of traffic intended for 
vehicles traveling in the opposite direction at a 
time when plaintiff's car was approaching in 
such close proximity that the collision occurred 
as soon as the front end of defendant's ear had 
reached a few feet into plaintiff's lane of traffic. 
Had plaintiff's car run into the rear end of de-
fendant's car after the front end thereof had en-
tirely crossed plaintiff's course of travel, there 
might have been some question whether the turn 
could be made with reasonable safety, but under 
the facts in this case it is clear that as a matter of 
laV\r the turn could not be made with reasonable 
safety, and the defendant was guilty of negligence. 
The defendant's testimony that he looked and did 
not see any car coming does not help his situation, 
beeause if he had paid attention to what was there 
to be seen he "rould have seen plaintiff's car com-
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ing, ns it \vas approaching in the immediate vici-
nity, and there is no claim that it did not have 
proper lights. It is equally clear that such nHgli-
gence of the defendant \vas at least one of the 
proximate causes of the accident. The accident 
\\Tas the immediate and direct result of this negli-
g·ence, and \vithout such negligence it would not 
have occurred.'' 
Sine Y. Salt Lake rrransportation Co., 106 
Utah 289, 147 Par. 2d 875. 
There this court held that regardless of right of way, 
it is negligence to driYe in front of an oncoming vehicle. 
See also: 
Bullock YS. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 28 Pac. 2d 350. 
~Iingus vs. Olsson, ________ Utah ________ , 201 Pac. 2d 495. 
Conklin vs. Walsh, ________ Utah ________ , 193 Pac. 2d 437. 
Hickok vs. Skinner, ______ Utah ______ , 190 Pa·c. 2d 514. 
This court also considered the same statute as ap-
plied to a criminal case in State vs. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 
144 Pac. 2d 290, where the facts were not far different 
from this case and where this court used very strong lan-
guage in describing those who make left turns at inter-
sections into the path of oncoming vehicles. 
In this last case the vehicle was 400 or 500 feet away 
when plaintiff last sa\v it. He was held to be negligent as 
a matter of law. 
This case is stronger against plaintiff than most of 
those cases. Under his first story and under his second 
~) 
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story if you believe· his evidence (which was positive that 
the truck was going 20 to 25 miles per hour) the truck 
was not over 40 feet away when he drove: 6 feet in front 
of it. You can disregard the evidence of Olsson, defend-
ant's driver, that he veered to the right in an effort to 
avoid the collision when he saw that plaintiff was not 
going to stop, but such is the only reasonable conclusion 
from plaintiff's own evidence. Plaintiff and his witness 
Reeves both said ''it happened so fast''. It could only 
happen that fast if they were in such close· proximity as 
to constitute an immediate hazard and a violation of both 
statutes. 
This case IS also much stronger against plaintiff 
than some of those cases in that some of the parties in-
volved in those cases claimed not to have seen the oncom-
ing vehicles. In this case both plaintiff and .his witness 
claimed to have seen it and neither of them testified that 
they thought it would stop or that plaintiff attempted to 
stop; although plaintiff in his revised version of his 
story said he didn't see the truck at all until six feet 
from the point of impact, at which time it was 100 to 120 
feet away, coming at 20 to 25 miles per hour. In his 
original edition lie said he saw it when he first entered 
the intersection and again saw it just before the impact. 
In either case he was negligent, because in his first edi-
tion he saw it coming and failed to stop, and in his 
revised edition he didn't see it at all until just befor~ 
the impact. If that was the fact he was negligent in fail-
ing to look. 
10 
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There are t''To stories in this case which are not 
entitled to credence because palpably impossible under 
the testimony. 
1. That defendant's truck went 120 feet at 20 to 
25 miles per hour while plaintiff's car traveled six feet 
at eight miles per hour. It just can't be done according 
to any mathematics· and conflicts with the positive 
testimony of plaintiff to the contrary. 
2. That defendant's truck was driving in the west 
lane of the 'vest side of the street, veered 30 or 40 feet 
to the west and hit plaintiff's car 10 to 12 feet east of 
the west crosswalk. It just can't be done. The inter-
section \Yas 90 feet each way, 45 feet on each side of the 
center; two lanes on each side of the center. If defend-
ant's truck veered 30 or 40 feet to the west from its posi-
tion in the west lane, it was clear out of the intersection 
and couldn't have hit plaintiff's car 10 or 12 feet east of 
the west crosswalk. 
In passing upon the motion for directed verdict it 
was not necessary for the court to disregard this wholly 
unbelievable evidence, although under the decisions of 
this court it could have done so. But even if you believe 
the unbelievable you still arrive at the same result under 
our statutes and decisions. 
Plaintiff seems to feel that the quotation from Blash-
field and Hess vs. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 Pac. 2d 510, 
are authority for having the case go to a jury, on the 
theory that defendant was proceeding through the inter-
section on an amber light. 
11 
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We have not discussed in this appeal whether plain-
tiff was or was not negligent. That issue- is beside the 
point. The only question here is whether plaintiff, under 
his evidence, was guilty of contributory negligence. In 
this connection, however, it will be noted that plaintiff 
did not plead a violation of the statute or an ordinance 
in that regard. Now here in the complaint does he allege 
that defendant went through an amber light, as an act of 
negligence. 
We could well argue that he failed to prove any negli-
gence of defendant as alleged but on this appeal that 
question is beside the issue because the case was decided 
by_ the trial court on the ground that the uncontradicted 
evidence established by plaintiff's own evidence showed 
contributory negligence on his part. 
The case of Hess vs. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 Pac. 
2d 510, does not help plaintiff. In that case the defendant 
ran a stop sign and the plaintiff might have had reason-
able grounds for believing that defendant would stop 
under one view of the evidence as to the speed that the 
ambulance was travelling. The court found that plain-
tiff was negligent but let the case go to the jury on the 
question as to whether his negligence proximately con-
tributed to the accident. In this case the plaintiff saw 
the· defendant's car coming at 20 to 25 miles per hour, 
made a left turn in front of it because he thought he 
could make it and he says the reason he didn't make it 
was because his car didn't get away as fast as he thought 
it would. Under any of his stories he made a left turn 
1~ 
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in front of an oncoming cnr that he knew, according to 
his own testimony, ""as. at most 100 to 120 feet away, 
and "·hich was coming through the intersection at 20 to 
25 miles per hour either on a. green light or a light that 
had just turned amber 'vhen the truck was about to 
enter. There "·as no doubt as to the fact that p~lain­
tiff 's negligence contributed to the accident because he 
testified that he was hit about six feet from the time he 
looked ( ""hether first or last, according to which of his 
stories you aeeept) and sa'v the truck coming. 
Certainly if it was negligence in the above recently 
decided cases, then plaintiff was negligent in this case 
under any of his stories. 
It is most significant in this case that plaintiff failed 
to plead as an act of negligence of defendant that de-
fendant proceeding through the intersection in violation 
of the traffic control signal. This fact alone distinguishes 
the case at bar from the Hess case. 
LAST CLEAR CI-IANCE 
Plaintiff says he was entitled to go to the jury on the 
doctrine of last clear chance under the doctrine of 
Graham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 Pac. 2d 230. 
In the first place plaintiff did not plead any such 
ground of negligence. He rested his case on a denial of 
any negligence on his part. Last clear chance must he 
pleaded if it is relied upon as a ground of negligence or as 
a defense to allegations of contributory negligence. 
13 
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38 Am .Juris. 960, Sec. 271 under Negligence. 
If plaintiff had pleaded last clear chance, which he 
did not, he still would not bring himself within the doc-
trine. He was tlie one, and the only one, who had the last 
clear chance- to- a void the accident. According to his 
evidence he was going only eight miles per hour when he 
made the left turn into the path of the oncoming truck. 
It is a fair assumption that he could have- stopped before 
reaching the ·west lane of the west side of the street. 
He saw the truck coming and was able to approximate 
its s.peed at 20 to 25 miles per hour and according to his 
revised story it was 100 to 120 feet away. Why didn't he 
stop~ He undoubtedly could have. He says he thought 
he could make it but his car didn't get away as fast as 
he thought it would. The doctrine of last clear chance puts 
the burden on him-not the other fellow, who has a right 
to assume that he will not violate the law by failing to 
yield the right of way. In the case of Graham v. Johnson, 
cited by plaintiff, the defendant knew the boys were play-
ing in the street in violation of the ordinance. She had 
stopped 49 feet from them and then moved slowly in their 
direction, knowing that they were playing, failed to 
honk or warn them, and this court held it was a jury 
question as to whether she still could have stopped after 
a boy yelled to the Graham boy to look out. Plaintiff's 
position is akin to the Johnson gir 1, not the Graham 
boy. That is an entirely different proposition than 
plaintiff's case. And in that case Mr. Justice Wolfe said 
that the doctorine would apply only if the Johnson girl 
had ample time to stop or other\vise, by the sound of the 
14 
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horn, avoid the accident. He gaTe an illustration of nn 
intersection ease \Yhere it \vould apply, as a stalled car 
\vhere the defendant had ample time to stop or avoid the 
accident. He also \Yarned that the doctrine should be 
guarded against misapplication and that the word 
"clear'' ,,~as a Yery significant part of it, in the following 
language: 
''But in the last clear chance doctrine the 
\vord 'clear' has significance. In a. case such as 
this \Yhen both parties are more or less rapidly 
changing· their positions the evidence must be 
clear and conYincing that the party whom it is 
claimed could have avoided the aecident had a 
'clear' chance to do so." 
~ir. Justice \\T olfe also wrote the very recent. opin-
ion in the ca.se of Holmgren vs. Union Pacific, 198 Pac. 
2d ±59, "Therein the same doctrine was considered and dis-
cussed and applied to a railroad accident and similar lan-
guage \Yas used as bet\veen two moving vehicles. 
Another excellent discussion of the doctrine is con-
tained in Horsley Ys. Robinson, ________ Utah -~------, 186 Pac. 
2d 592, particularly in the concurring opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Wolfe, \\.,.herein among other things the following 
is said: 
''A driver is not ordinarily required to anti-
cipate that another \vill have gotten out of his 
proper path of travel and that he, the driver 
must drive so as to create for some other a last · 
elear chance opportunity. 1\.. driver of a car does 
not carry with him an anticipatory last clear 
chance obligation. Sueh obligation arises only 
after the operator of the vehicle is or should be 
15 
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aware of the position of the other,. who, being in 
a position of danger, is unaware of his peril, or, 
if aware, unable timely to extricate himself 
from it." 
A similar result was reached in Richards v. Palace 
Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. 439, where the doc-
trine~ sought to be applied by a bicycle rider who rode 
from the east to the west side of the center of a street and 
fell in front of a motor bus which was 25 or 30 feet away, 
approaching at nine miles per hour. 
Cases are legion holding that the doctrine does not 
apply to a case of this kind where the plaintiff drove in 
front of an oncoming vehicle by making a left turn in 
violation of t\vo statutes when he actually saw the other 
car so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Plain-
tiff's witness Reeves testified (R. 40-41) that the truck 
was about half the width of the pavement aw~y when 
they were south and west of the semaphore (making the 
left turn) and plaintiff said in his revised story the 
truck was six feet away when he first saw it, and in his 
first story that it was six feet away when he saw it for 
the second time. What has this situation to do with 
the doctrine of last clear chance, even if it had been 
pleaded~ 
\V e respectfully submit that the trial court properly 
directed a verdict upon the evidence most favorable to 
plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICI-I AND ELTON, 
Attorneys for Responde,nt. 
16 
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